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Abstract. We use a panel dataset of about 5,000 Lithuanian firms between 2003 and 2010, to 
assess the impact of the EU ETS on the environmental and economic performance of 
participating firms. Using a matching methodology, we are able to estimate the causal 
impact of EU ETS participation on CO2 emissions, CO2 intensity, investment behaviour and 
profitability of participating firms. Our results show that ETS participation did not lead to a 
reduction in CO2 emissions, while we identify a slight improvement in CO2 intensity. ETS 
participants are shown to have retired part of their less efficient capital stock, and to have 
made modest additional investments from 2010. We also show that the EU ETS did not 
represent a drag on the profitability of participating firms.  
 
1. Introduction 
As the post-Doha political debate moves on from the old Kyoto framework towards a new 
post-2020 global policy regime, flexibility mechanisms, that theoretically facilitate the 
achievement of policy goals at least cost, take centre stage. In this context, emissions trading 
systems, with the possibility they offer to link emissions reduction efforts across space and 
time, seem poised to become one of the pillars upon which future cost-effective mitigation 
efforts will be built.  As a consequence, there is considerable interest in understanding how 
these market-based instruments perform in practice. In particular, there is a growing 
appetite on the part of policy makers for empirical analyses that shed light on how 
participation in emissions trading systems affects the economic and environmental 
performance of regulated entities. To date, however, only a handful of studies have 
attempted such an analysis. 
In this paper we exploit a previously unexplored firm-level dataset to investigate these 
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questions in the context of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). A rich 
dataset of Lithuanian firms spanning the years between 2003 and 2010 allows us to 
investigate the impact of the EU ETS on emissions, profitability and investment decisions.   
The unique features of the data allow us to directly compare emissions between ETS and 
non-ETS firms, something that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been possible before. 
While this is the main motivation for our choice of Lithuania as a case study, we believe that 
our findings can be informative about the behaviour of firms elsewhere in the EU ETS. 
Indeed, Lithuania’s ETS coverage is sufficiently broad to suggest that the average treatment 
effects we estimate as a result of our empirical analysis - for example, as refers to emissions 
and emissions intensity – are broadly transferrable to firms operating elsewhere in the EU. 
Lithuania has a well-developed financial sector, its currency is pegged to the euro, and it is 
also an extremely open economy1; its larger firms, such as the ones in our dataset, operate 
across several markets, including ones outside of the EU.2 Hence, information about the 
competitiveness challenges faced by Lithuanian firms is likely to be highly indicative of the 
challenges facing similar firms elsewhere. Finally, Lithuania has been one of the fastest 
growing economies in the EU for over a decade and, in this sense, the results from our 
analysis are also likely to be relevant to policy makers in other fast growing economies 
contemplating the introduction of emissions trading schemes. 
Our analysis adds to the scant ex-post empirical literature on the EU ETS by investigating the 
                                                          
1
 The ratio of international trade to GDP has exceeded 80 per cent since 2000, and 100 per cent since 2005. The 
latest figure available is 137 per cent, according to Statistics Lithuania (http://www.stat.gov.lt/). 
2
 Russia is the largest Lithuania’s trade partner representing 33 per cent of all imports and 17 per cent of all 
exports. 
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causal effects of the EU ETS on firm-level environmental and economic performance.3  
Exploiting the peculiar features of our data, we are able to make the most of the design 
characteristics of the EU ETS4, and to construct a reliable counterfactual, i.e. believable 
estimate of the outcome variables that would have been observed in the absence of the EU 
ETS. Given that only a subset of firms in each sector were required to participate in the EU 
ETS, we can directly compare environmental and economic outcomes of ETS firms to those 
of similar firms outside the scheme. One important advantage of this approach is that the 
counterfactual estimates are free of the potentially confounding effects of changing 
economic conditions at country level, industry-wide production trends, and technological 
change.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we are the first – to the best of our 
knowledge – to be able to compare the evolution over time of CO2 emissions by ETS firms to 
that of firms outside of the EU ETS. We do this within a classic non-experimental program 
evaluation framework, using matching algorithms to derive causal inferences on the impact 
of the program. Secondly, by exploiting a richer dataset than previously done in the 
literature, we are able to investigate the effect of the EU ETS on the economic performance 
of firms in greater detail. For example, we complement the analysis of firms’ profitability 
with a discussion of investment decisions. Finally, our dataset spans the first and (most of) 
                                                          
3
 There is a large body of literature attempting ex-ante “evaluation” exercises on the EU ETS. Böhringer, 
Hoffmann, Lange, Löschel, and Moslener (2005) and Kemfert, Kohlhaas, Truong, and Protsenko (2006), for 
example, present evidence at the aggregate level, whereas Neuhoff, Keats, and Sato (2006) and Demailly and 
Quirion (2008), among others, discuss sectorial impacts. 
4
 Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis (2010) is probably the most authoritative reference on the EU ETS. It 
contains a detailed discussion of the design of the ETS and provides a comprehensive analysis of Phase I. 
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the second phase of the EU ETS (2004-2010), thus extending and updating previous results. 
Our analysis starts by assessing the environmental consequences of the EU ETS. We first look 
into actual emissions reductions – so called “abatement” – by comparing actual CO2 
emissions with counterfactual CO2 emissions. Only a handful of previous studies have 
documented aggregate emissions abatement in the first phase of the EU ETS. Ellerman and 
Buchner (2008) calculate that 130-200 Mt of CO2 were abated in 2005 and 140-220 Mt in 
2006, across all EU member states. Anderson and Di Maria (2011) improve on these results 
using more refined data for 2005-2007 and estimate overall abatement at 247 Mt of CO2 
during the first phase. They also find evidence of emissions “inflation”, however, i.e. they 
show that several countries had actual emissions in excess of the counterfactual. Delarue, 
Ellerman, and D'Haeseleer (2010), Pettersson, Söderholm, and Lundmark (2012), Linden, 
Mäkelä, and Uusivuori (2013), and Widerberg and Wråke (2009) explicitly focus on 
abatement in power generation. Delarue, Ellerman, and D'Haeseleer (2010) analyse the 
power sector's CO2 short-term abatement possibilities through fuel switching. The authors 
estimate abatement of the European power sector’s to be in the range of 34.4-63.6 Mt of 
CO2 in 2005, and 19.2-35 Mt in 2006. Pettersson, Söderholm, and Lundmark (2012) use a 
Generalized-Leontieff model of the electricity sector calibrated on data from eight western 
European countries – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the 
UK – over the time period 1980-2004 to support the view that the elasticity of substitution, 
especially between oil and gas, may be rather high in the short run. Their model suggests 
that an allowance price of US$90 would lead to a 2 per cent decrease in CO2 emissions, via 
fuel-switching only (using 2004 as the base year, this is equivalent to 18Mt of CO2). Linden, 
Mäkelä, and Uusivuori (2013) find that the EU ETS has short term impacts on the fuel mixes 
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of the energy plants in Finland. The elasticity of substitution between fossil and non-fossil 
fuels is larger under the ETS. Widerberg and Wråke (2009) look at the effect of the carbon 
price on the CO2 emissions intensity of the Swedish electricity sector for the period 2004–
2008. They find no statistically significant link between the price of CO2 and CO2 emissions, 
and conclude that it is unlikely that there are significant volumes of low-cost CO2 abatement 
possibilities with short response times in the Swedish electricity sector. Finally, Abrell, Faye, 
and Zachmann (2011), use CITL data to test whether the EU ETS induced acceleration in 
emissions reductions, and find some evidence to the positive.  In the current paper, for the 
first time we are able to look at abatement at the firm level, thanks to the unique 
characteristics of our dataset. 
We then investigate the economic consequences of carbon pricing. Emission reductions 
generally entail costs as resources need to be reallocated from production activities to 
emissions reduction. In principle, these costs depend on the stringency of the carbon 
constraint, the tighter the cap the higher the marginal abatement cost or CO2 price, and the 
greater the cost, all else being equal. Since the EU is the only region in the world in which a 
carbon price is applied on such a scale, the EU ETS might have serious implications in terms 
of the loss of competiveness it causes to ETS firms versus both European firms outside of the 
EU ETS, and their non-European competitors. We address the impact of the EU ETS on 
competitiveness by looking at a firm's ability to generate profits. In doing this, we can also 
gauge the implications of the free permits allocation for firms’ profitability.  Our dataset also 
allows us to investigate whether ETS firms exhibit a different behaviour relative to their non-
ETS counterparts when it comes to investment in tangible capital. This is particularly 
important in terms of the future competitive position and profitability of regulated firms. 
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To date, only a few studies have analysed the impact of the EU ETS on firm competitiveness, 
profitability or general economic performance ex-post.5 Potentially negative impacts on 
competitiveness have understandably been the main concern of firms within the EU ETS, and 
have been the focus of most empirical analyses. Energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industrial activities namely cement, glass, iron and steel, paper and pulp, refining and 
aluminium, are arguably the most exposed among the EU ETS sectors in terms of 
international competition. Empirical research using trade data (imports into the EU as well as 
exports from the European Union), however, has found no evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that the introduction of the EU ETS placed such sectors at a competitive 
disadvantage, at least in the first trading period (Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis 2010). 
Similar conclusions are reached by Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) who do not find that the 
first two years of the EU ETS had a negative effect on the revenue of German over-allocated 
and under-allocated ETS firms. Yu (2011) uses firm-level data to analyse the effects of ETS 
participation on the profitability of Swedish power generating firms in 2005 and 2006. Her 
results do not show any significant impact of the EU ETS on profitability in 2005, but suggest 
a significant negative impact in 2006, which, she argues, might be due to the collapse of the 
price of European Union Allowances (EUA). Abrell, Faye, and Zachmann (2011) assess the 
impact of the EU ETS on firm competitiveness based on data on 2,101 European ETS firms 
(3,608 installations) during 2005-2008 and find a modest impact on ETS firms’ economic 
performance. Chan, Shanjun, and Zhang (2012) use a panel of 5,873 firms in 10 European 
countries during 2001-2009 and seek to assess the impact of the EU ETS on three variables 
through which the effects on firm competitiveness may manifest – unit material costs, 
                                                          
5
 See Zhang and Wei (2010) and Venmans (2012) for overviews of research on the EU ETS.  
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employment and revenue. Their findings do not substantiate concerns over carbon leakage, 
job losses or industry competitiveness. Overall, all these studies suggest that the concerns 
about the negative impact of EU ETS on competitiveness can be dismissed, at least in the 
first trading years. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on 
Lithuania’s experience with the EU ETS; Section 3 outlines the research design and the data 
sources used in this analysis; Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results; finally, 
Section 5 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Lithuania in the EU ETS 
Lithuania’s overall CO2 emissions increased between 2000 and 2007 – peaking at 15.81 Mt –  
and subsequently decreased to just below 14Mt in 2010 (See Table 1). In per-capita terms, 
emissions increased from 3.37 tonnes in 2000 to 4.12 tonnes in 2010. On average, the ETS 
sectors contributed around 43 per cent of total CO2 emissions between 2005 and 2010.  
Table 1 Lithuania’s total, per capita and ETS CO2 emissions 
Year Total CO2 emissions, Mt CO2 emissions per capita, t ETS CO2 Emissions, Mt 
2000 12.06 3.37 
 2001 12.75 3.60 
 2002 12.88 3.65 
 2003 12.60 3.66 
 2004 13.42 3.84 
 2005 14.19 4.09 6.60 
2006 14.57 4.23 6.52 
2007 15.81 4.66 6.00 
2008 15.09 4.49 6.10 
2009 12.95 3.86 5.79 
2010 13.84 4.12 6.39 
Source: European Environmental Agency (EEA). 
9 
 
Under the Kyoto agreement, Lithuania had a target to reduce its CO2 emissions by 8 per cent 
relative to the 1990 level by 2008-2012. In reality, the fact that Lithuania gained 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1990 and subsequently underwent major structural 
changes during its transition to a market economy explains why emissions in Lithuania have 
been significantly below the Kyoto target since 1993.6 Therefore, Lithuania recognised that it 
would have no difficulty implementing the Kyoto target and its first period ETS allocation 
would reflect forecasted business-as-usual emissions. Lithuania accessed the European 
Union in May 2004, and it was fully integrated into the first phase of the EU ETS. Its first 
period  National Allocation Plan (NAP) was finalised on 27 December 2004 (Zapfel 2007). 
Table 2 summarises the first period permit allocation for Lithuania. In the first period, the 
NAP allocated over 36 million EUAs to 93 installations. As a consequence, Lithuanian 
installations had a net long position of 15.40 million EUAs (almost 45 per cent when 
compared with the initial allocation excluding unexecuted allowances).7 
The significant over-allocation of permits to Lithuanian’s firms came about as the result of 
wrong expectations in terms of the impact of changes in the Lithuanian electric power 
market following the closure of the first reactor unit of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 
(Ignalina NPP) on 31 December 2004. Indeed, at the time the NAP was being drafted, there 
was a widespread belief that this would imply a large increase in fossil-fuel-based 
                                                          
6
 According to GHG inventory data under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in 
2007 GHG emissions in Lithuania were down 53 per cent on the 1990 level. During this period, real GDP 
increased by 101 per cent. 
7
 The CITL does not incorporate the data on allocated reserves. See McGuinness and Trotignon (2007) for a 
detailed discussions on how information on the reserves can be combined with the CITL data.  
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generation. This was the main reason behind the increase in the number of EUAs allocated 
to Lithuanian energy enterprises. The extent of this increase is illustrated by Štreimikiene 
(2008): in 1998, CO2 emissions from power-generating firms participating in the EU ETS 
accounted for 5.19 Mt, while the annual first period allocation of those firms was 7.59 Mt of 
CO2.  In fact, during the first trading period, the actual verified emissions for combustion 
installations, which are mainly owned by power generating firms, were on average about 
3.63 Mt of CO2 per annum.  
Table 2 Lithuania’s first period allocation, 2005-2007 
Recipient    EUAs 
For issuance to not new entrants 
 
34 394 402 
Not yet executed 
 
10 142 
In reserve 
 
2 391 640 
Total 
 
36 796 184 
Verified emissions  
 
18 995 650 
Net position (without reserves) 
 
15 398 752 
Net position, % (without reserves) 44.77 
Note: not yet executed EUAs are not taken into account. 
Sources: CITL as of 1 August 2010 and the authors’ calculations.  
 
The two main reasons underlying this shortfall in emissions were that the second unit at 
Ignalina NPP operated very efficiently throughout 2005, and the time spent for regular 
maintenance was kept to a minimum, and the concomitant increase in natural gas prices in 
2005. Given the increased cost of domestic gas-fired generation, the growing electricity 
demand was met by electricity imported from Russia and Estonia, rather than by increases in 
domestic supply (Štreimikiene 2008). Electricity produced by Ignalina NPP decreased from 
15,102 GWh in 2004 to 9,914 GWh on average during the period 2005-2009, but electricity 
import increased from 4 ,293 GWh in 2004 to 5,546 GWh on average in the same period. It is 
also worth mentioning that Lithuania remained a net exporter of electricity through 2009 
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(See Figure 1).  
Figure 1 Lithuania’s electricity balance, 2000-2010 
 
Source: Lithuanian Energy Institute 
 
As a consequence of the generous allocation of permits, Lithuanian firms were able to sell 
large amounts of allowances and benefit from wind-fall profits. Table 3 reproduces 
information from Ellerman and Trotingnon (2009) and summarises information on the flows 
of EUAs from Lithuania. Not surprisingly, Lithuania was a net exporter of allowances in the 
first trading period, exporting almost 11 million EUAs. Three quarters of the Lithuanian EUAs 
were transferred in 2007 when the price of carbon was at its lowest. Assuming that 
surrendered allowances were acquired at the average price for the intervals before and 
between the end of April, dates when allowances were to be surrendered, at the time when 
these flows were monetised, we conclude that Lithuanian installations accrued most of their 
revenue from selling EUAs in 2006 when the price of EUAs averaged at 9.57 EUR.8 
                                                          
8
 It is important to note that Lithuania’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Registry started functioning only 
in November 2005. Only since then were ETS firms able to trade their EUAs (National Audit Office of Lithuania 
2008). This might explain why most of the EUAs were sold in 2006 and 2007 rather than in 2005.  
-15000 
-5000 
5000 
15000 
25000 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Import Thermal power plants 
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Table 3 Lithuania’s net allowance export and import flows, 2005-2007 
    
2005-07 2005 2006 2007 
EUAs sold, millions 10.93 0.42 2.36 8.15 
   
   
Revenue , millions € 
 
32.20  8.50 22.60 1.10 
       Source: Adapted from Ellerman and Trotingnon (2009). 
We can confirm that Lithuanian installations monetised their surpluses at very high prices 
thanks to the information collected by the National Audit Office of Lithuania on Lithuanian 
firms partly controlled by the Lithuanian Government. For these firms, we also have 
information about the way they used the revenue from allowances’ sales in the first trading 
period. Table 4 shows that the average price received per EUA ranges from 28.1 EUR to 5.79 
EUR. The Lithuanian power plant, which was expected to cover the energy shortage due to a 
closure of unit 1 at Ignalina NPP, sold the 4.65 Mt of EUAs out of received 7.40 Mt in total. It 
is also important to note that only about a tenth of this revenue was used for emission 
abatement.  
Table 4 Use of revenues by Lithuania’s ETS firms from sold allowances, 2005-2007 
Firms 
Sold allowances EUA price
1
, EUR Use of revenues form sold EUAs
2
 
‘000 EUAs Revenue
2
   GHG investment
3 
Other Unused 
Lithuanian PP 4650 26750.8 5.8 189.1 2891.0 23670.6 
Siauliai energy 30 766.0 25.5 117.6 602.7 45.8 
Klaipeda energy 40 1124.0 28.1 1124.0 - - 
Panevezys energy 85 2200.2 25.8 1131.5 1068.7 - 
Mazeikiu district heat 90 778.8 8.7 778.8 - - 
Taurages district heat 42 861.3 20.6 861.3 - - 
Utenos district heat  44 1141.1 26.1 10.7 261.5 - 
JSC Geoterma 33 533.5 16.2 10.7 522.8 868.9 
Total 5014 34155.8 7.0 4223.8 5346.7 24585.3 
Notes:  1. EUA price is average. 2. Revenue is in thousands €. 3. GHG investments include 
transaction costs. 
Sources: National Audit Office of Lithuania (2008) and the authors’ calculations.  
 
The operation of ETS firms during the first period provided useful information that was used 
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as a basis for the second period NAP (2008-2012). Consequently, the annual second period 
allocation for Lithuanian installations was significantly reduced, even allowing for the 
envisioned closure of the Ignalina NPP from January 2010 onwards. The NAPs for the second 
trading period were approved before the start of 2008. 
Despite the tighter second period allocation, the compliance results for the second trading 
period (2008-2012) reveal that in total ETS firms in Lithuania were still significantly over-
allocated (see Table 5). During 2008-2012 ETS firms in Lithuania received 39.64 million of 
EUAs. Lithuanian installations had the net long position of 10.03 million of EUAs (25.31 per 
cent when compared with the initial allocation). Again, this suggests that the second period 
allocation did not create strong incentives for ETS firms to mitigate their CO2 emissions, 
especially in light of the low level of EUAs prices over most of this period and of the 
increasing realisation of over-supply of permits after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
Table 5 Lithuania’s compliance during the second trading period, 2008-2011 
  Allocated EUAs Verified CO2 emissions, t Net position Net position, % 
2008 7 509 636 6 103 720 1 405 916 18.72 
2009 7 568 316 5 786 742 1 781 574 23.54 
2010 8 155 470 6 393 952 1 761 518 21.60 
2011 8 037 268 5 606 425 2 430 843 30.24 
2012 8 371 774 5 718 037 2 653 737 31.70 
TOTAL 39 642 464 29 608 876 10 033 588 25.31 
Source: European Environmental Agency as of 1 July 2013 and the authors’ calculations.  
 
3. Empirical Methodology and Data 
3.1.  Empirical framework 
The main goal of this paper is to empirically estimate the changes in a number of firms’ 
environmental and economic performance indicators relative to what would have occurred 
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if the EU ETS had not been implemented. Since we want to identify the causal effect of the 
EU ETS, we exploit the unique design features of the EU ETS to construct tenable and 
transparent estimates of counterfactual emissions and other outcome variables. As a 
counterfactual we use econometrically adjusted observed environmental and economic 
outcome variables at firms that were not subject to the EU ETS over the same period.  
A firm in the EU can find itself in one out of two regulatory states: it may be regulated under 
the EU ETS, or it may find itself outside of the ETS remit and hence be allowed unconstrained 
CO2 emissions. Let  be the indicator variable that identifies a firm’s participation in the EU 
ETS. Hence,   is equal to 1, if the  
   firm is in the EU ETS (that is the firm is “treated”). A 
firm,  , that is instead outside of the treated group is assumed to be unaffected by the EU 
ETS, and is identified by    . All firms with     are said to belong to the control group. 
       and        denote  potential outcomes at firm   and time  , conditional on 
participation and non-participation, respectively.  
We are interested in estimating the average treatment effect on the treated: 
                                             (1) 
where   represents any year following the introduction of the EU ETS and     measures the 
average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the desired outcome variable (e.g. the annual firm 
level CO2 emissions).  
CO2 emissions and other outcome variables of ETS and non-ETS firms are observed prior to 
the implementation of the EU ETS and over several years following its introduction. Firm-
level emissions data collected from ETS firms during the years following the introduction of 
the program can be used to identify               . The fundamental problem with causal 
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inference, however, is that we do not observe               , i.e. we do not know what 
would have happened to ETS firms if they had not participated in the scheme. To overcome 
this limitation, we take advantage of a key feature of the EU ETS, i.e. the fact that the EU ETS 
regulates only a subset of the largest CO2 emitters located within the 27 EU member states. 
Moreover, the remaining firms are not subject to any other type of carbon constraint, at 
least in Lithuania. The incomplete programme participation provides us with a potential 
comparison group as we are able to use econometrically adjusted observations on outcome 
variables relative to non-participants, to estimate the unobserved counterfactuals. 
The simplest estimate of     is obtained using standard differences-in-differences (DiD) 
estimators. These estimators, however, may be biased if the variables related to firm-level 
outcomes vary significantly across the treatment and comparison groups. To reduce this 
potential bias we utilise the observable differences across ETS participants and non-
participants to estimate     by using semi-parametric matching estimators.
9 
Matching estimators, which are used extensively in non-experimental program evaluation, 
                                                          
9
 As the EU ETS already includes the biggest emitters, it is unlikely to be able to find good non-ETS counterparts 
in terms of absolute emissions. The criteria according to which firms are included in the EU ETS along with a 
variety of matching algorithms (see below), however, allows us to find close non-ETS matches. The inclusion 
criteria are based on energy capacity and production at the installation level. In some cases an installation 
corresponds to a whole firm, but in many other cases it represents only a part of it. This suggests that there are 
firms which do not qualify for inclusion in the EU ETS based on the individual installation, but would qualify if 
the selection criteria were applied to the firm as a whole. Hence, it is the case that some of the non-ETS firms 
are closely comparable with ETS firms in terms of emissions at the firm level. In what follows, we discuss how 
we impose the common support property (e.g., Imbens, 2004), thus assuring that we have appropriate controls 
for even the largest ETS installations.  
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are an extension of standard regression approaches. Our general estimation strategy follows 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) who introduced the 
following DID matching estimator: 
      
 
  
                                              , (2) 
where    denotes the set of program participants;    denotes the set of non-participants; and 
   is the number of firms in the treatment group.
 The participants are indexed by j; the non-
participants are indicated by k. The weight placed on individual k when constructing the 
counterfactual estimate for treated facility j is   . Different matching estimators adopt 
different approaches to defining the weights    used to scale the contribution of each 
participant. In general, when the observable characteristics,   , of an untreated unit k are 
closer to the characteristics of a treated facility j (relative to other facilities in the control 
group), the untreated unit k is weighted relatively more heavily in the construction of a 
counterfactual estimate for unit j. 
Since the seminal work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity scores (i.e., the 
conditional probability of treatment) are used, rather than conditioning on all the relevant 
covariates. An important finding in the literature is that, if unconfoundedness holds, 
conditioning only on the propensity score assures the independence of    and       
(Imbens, 2004).10 While a variety of the propensity-score-based matching algorithms are 
                                                          
10
 Unconfoundedness, a term introduced by Rubin (1990), indicates the situation in which adjusting for 
differences in a fixed set of covariates removes biases in comparisons between treated and control entities, 
thus allowing for a causal interpretation of those adjusted differences. 
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available,11 in what follows, we use the nearest neighbour (NN) and Kernel matching 
estimators. The NN estimator is the most straightforward matching estimator. An 
appropriate facility from the control group is selected as the matching partner for a treated 
facility on the basis of its exhibiting the closest propensity score. In our case, we use NN 
matching with replacement since each untreated firm can be used more than once as a 
match. Matching with replacement involves a trade-off between bias and variance. By 
allowing replacement, the average quality of matching will increase and the bias will 
decrease, especially when one has a relatively small group of comparable facilities in the 
control group, as we do. 
The main difference between Kernel matching and NN matching is that instead of using only 
a few observations from the comparison group, weighted averages of all individuals are used 
in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. That is, it constructs a match 
for each treated entity using a kernel-weighted average over multiple entities in the control 
group. Smith and Todd (2005) note that Kernel matching can be seen as a weighted 
regression of the counterfactual outcome on an intercept with weights given by the kernel 
weights. The weights depend on the distance between each control group observation and 
the treated observation for which the counterfactual is being estimated. Thus, one major 
advantage of this approach is the lower variance which is achieved because more 
information is used. The main demerit of this approach is that it utilises all observations, 
including ones that are objectively poor matches. This problem is eased by properly 
imposing the common support condition. 
                                                          
11
 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a non-technical discussion about the properties of various matching 
estimators. 
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3.2. Data  
Our primary data come from the annual “Sample survey of non-financial enterprises (F-01)” 
administered by Statistics Lithuania (LS). The survey collects data on the main financial 
indicators for the sampled enterprises. We use eight waves of the survey (2003-2010), 
whose sample sizes vary between 8,000 and 17,000 firms.  
Sampled firms belong to NACE (Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community) Revision sectors 10-40. We exclude firms belonging to NACE 4012 
(Transmission of electricity), 4013 (Distribution and trade of electricity) and 4022 
(Distribution and trade of gaseous fuels through mains) as these firms are service providers 
such as gas and electricity distributors.  
The dataset includes fuel purchases, turnover, capital stock, and profits. Importantly, the 
dataset also includes a breakdown of fossil fuels expenditures by fuel type. This unique 
feature allows us to infer quantities purchased from the expenditure data. Applying average 
emissions coefficients to the estimated quantities, we are able to obtain estimates of CO2 
emissions by both ETS and non-ETS firms (see the Appendix). This allows us to compare 
changes in CO2 emissions by ETS firms with the behaviour of unregulated firms outside the 
ETS. 12  Unfortunately, the disaggregated fossil fuels expenditure series have been 
                                                          
12
 We were able to identify ETS firms thanks to the collaboration of the LS, who matched sampled firms to a list 
of Lithuanian firms participating in the EU ETS prepared by the authors, based on the CITL installation data. For 
confidentiality reasons, however, we were not able to obtain a matched dataset of Lithuanian firms with CITL 
data. 
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discontinued from 2008; hence we are only able to conduct our analysis of CO2 emissions 
until the end of phase 1, in 2007.  
Due to the sampling methodology, the data set is strongly unbalanced. To avoid biasing our 
estimations, we restrict our analysis using the largest possible balanced panel. As a 
consequence of this adjustment, some firms drop from our sample. 
A complete list of the variables used in the analysis, together with the usual set of 
descriptive statistics is presented in Table 6. The data are summarised for the balanced 
sample running from 2003 until 2010, broken down by EU ETS participation status.  
The data exhibit notable differences between ETS and non-ETS firms. As expected, ETS firms 
on average emit more CO2, produce more output, and are more capital intensive. On the 
other hand, ETS firms on average are less profitable than non-ETS ones.  
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics, Lithuania 2003-2007/2010 
   
ETS firms Non-ETS firms 
Variable Period Measurement Unit Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev. 
Fossil fuel expenditure 2003-2007 ‘000 LTL 205 21 898 64 760 2 800 370 1 331 
Fossil fuel CO2 emissions 2003-2007 Kilo tonnes 205 139.2 377.2 2 800 1.645 5.897 
Fossil fuel CO2 emissions/turnover 2003-2007 Tonnes/‘000 LTL 205 1.309 1.394 2 800 0.110 0.345 
Turnover 2003-2010 ‘000 LTL 328 120 061 217 734 4 480 26 371 67 292 
Tangible capital assets 2003-2010 ‘000 LTL 328 110 212 272 518 4 480 12 274 84 873 
Net gross profit before tax/turnover 2003-2010 ‘000 LTL/‘000 LTL 328 -0.052 0.450 4 480 0.040 0.220 
Notes:  
1. All monetary variables are in real terms. 
2. €1 = LTL 3.4528 
Sources: Statistics Lithuania and the authors’ calculations.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Matching  
To estimate a propensity score, i.e. the probability that a firm is regulated under the EU ETS 
based on their observable characteristics, for each firm in the sample we use a probit model. 
Since the choice of the observable covariates in the propensity score model must satisfy the 
unconfoundedness assumption, the selection of covariates is crucial. All the important 
variables that influence both the participation decision and the outcome variables should be 
included. Hence, both economic theory and the policy setting must be used as a guide. In 
addition, only variables that are unaffected by participation should be included in the model. 
To ensure this, we choose variables that are either fixed over time, or measured before 
participation.  
In our study, the propensity scores are measured using data for 2004. The explanatory 
variables include the amount of fossil-fuel-based energy used by the firm, the stock of 
tangible capital assets, the firm’s turnover, and a dummy identifier for whether the firm 
belongs to the NACE 40 industries.13 We enforce a common support or overlap condition. 
This ensures that any combination of characteristics observed in the treatment group can 
also be observed among firms in the control group. Balance is achieved and there is a 
significant overlap in the propensity scores of the treatment and comparison groups (see 
Table 7).14 
                                                          
13
 NACE 40: Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply.  
14
 Our estimation is carried out in STATA, using the “pscore” procedure developed by Becker and Ichino 2002. 
Adding option “comsup” to the estimation, we ensure that balancing is achieved. The statistical procedure 
implemented is extremely demanding in that the balancing property is not rejected only in the case that it 
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Table 7 Distribution of control and treated entities according to their propensity scores in 
the panel satisfying the common support condition 
Propensity score Non-ETS firms ETS firms Total 
0-0.09 261 6 267 
0.01-0.149 21 0 21 
0.15-0.199 8 3 11 
0.20-0.399 12 10 22 
0.4-0.599 6 8 14 
0.6-0.799 3 4 7 
0.8-1 1 10 11 
Total 312 41 353 
Notes: Seven number of blocks optimally selected, significance level 0.01.  
 
Table 8 presents the results of the propensity score measurement. As expected, firms with 
higher consumption of fossil fuels and more tangible capital assets are more likely to be 
included in the EU ETS. Additionally, firms belonging to the NACE 40 industries are also more 
likely to be engaged in emissions trading. The volume of turnover has a negative and 
significant effect, albeit only at the 10 per cent significance level.  
Table 8 Measurement of propensity scores 
Variables Coef. 
 
Std. err. 
Fossil fuel quantity 0.245 *** 0.063 
Capital 0.538 *** 0.152 
Turnover -0.281 * 0.154 
NACE 40 1.223 *** 0.333 
Constant -4.658 *** 0.881 
Number of observations 601 
  LT 2 (4) 150.500 
  Prob. > 2 0.000 
  Pseudo R2 0.503   
    Notes:  1. *** p <= 0.01, ** p <= 0.05, * p <= 0.1. 
                                  2. All monetary variables are in natural logarithms. 
4.2 Average Effects of the EU ETS on ETS Firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
holds for every component of the conditioning vector (see Becker and Ichino 2002 for details). Additional 
details on the procedure and the complete test results are available from the authors upon request. 
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This subsection reports the results of the Kernel and NN matching specifications reflecting 
the EU ETS impacts. Although the European Emissions Trading Directive was ratified in 
October 2003, the Lithuanian NAP was approved only in the second half of 2004. Therefore, 
we use the year 2004 as the pre-treatment year. The outcome variables in the year 2004 are 
then compared with their counterparts in subsequent years (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 
and 201015). To better understand the dynamics of the effects, we also compute year-on-
year changes. Treatment effects are calculated using a “levels” specification. 
Total CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity 
As the primary goal of the EU ETS is the reduction in absolute GHG emissions, the first 
question to be explored is whether the EU ETS effected any significant changes in total CO2 
emissions. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of average CO2 emissions among ETS firms 
between 2003 and 2007. Emissions hovered around the pre-treatment average well into 
Phase I of the ETS, before increasing in 2007. The results from our matching estimation show 
that these dynamics are not peculiar to ETS firms, but are rather mirrored by comparable 
firms outside of the treatment group. The results in Table 9 shows that changes over time in 
CO2 emissions among ETS firms, where not significantly different in a statistical sense from 
changes that occurred among firms in the control group. We can conclude that, in terms of 
overall CO2 emissions, the introduction of the EU ETS did not significantly affect the 
behaviour of ETS firms, relative to non-ETS ones. Given that Lithuanian’s ETS firms were 
significantly over-allocated in the first trading periods, and that the price of allowances was 
already very low by the time allowance trading started to take place in earnest, these finding 
are hardly surprising. 
                                                          
15
 Some of the outcome variables, most notably CO2 emissions, are only available until 2007.  
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Figure 2 Average CO2 emissions of ETS firms, 2003-2007 
 
Source: The authors’ calculations from LS data. 
 
These absolute measures, while interesting from the point of view of the environmental 
integrity of the policy, do not allow us to discriminate between changes in production levels 
and other adjustments the firms might have made, for example, in terms of their fuel mix or 
their production technologies. To gain some insight into this second group of factors, we 
next look at changes in CO2 intensity, measured as the ratio of CO2 emissions over turnover.  
Figure 3 shows that, contrary to the trendless emissions path, the emissions intensity of 
turnover for ETS firms in our sample continued to creep up until 2005, started decreasing in 
2006 and fell markedly in 2007. Our matching exercise (see Table 9) confirms this 
development. In particular, the year-on-year changes confirm the information derived from 
the previous picture, and inform us that these changes were not significantly different from 
the behaviour of non-ETS firms, with the exception of the marked reduction in 2007, which is 
significantly larger than the comparable change for non-ETS firms. Thus, ETS firms seem to 
have used the first years of the scheme operation to (slowly) learn how to improve on their 
environmental efficiency, possibly opting to reduce their use of the most CO2 intensive 
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fuels, 16 purchasing electricity rather than self-generating, and investing in cleaner 
technology.  
Figure 3 Average CO2 emissions intensity of ETS firms, 2003-2007 
 
Source: The authors’ calculations from LS data. 
 
Fuel mix and electricity purchase 
To investigate which of these strategies have been followed by Lithuanian ETS firms, we start 
by looking at purchases of fossil fuels by the ETS firms in our sample.  
As expected, the vast majority of fossil-fuel based energy generation in Lithuanian is based 
on natural gas, with coal and oil distant second and third. Figure 4 illustrates that the share 
of oil has been consistently decreasing over time, while coal has increased slightly. This is 
suggestive of a progressive shift away from expensive oil into cheaper coal and cleaner gas. 
                                                          
16
 These results are in line with the existing literature on fuel-switching, see e.g. Pettersson, Söderholm, and 
Lundmark (2012). 
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The increased reliance on gas by ETS firms is likely to have been the result of the need to 
compensate for the decrease in electricity output following the closure of Unit 1 of the 
Ignalina NPP on 31 December 2004. The increase, however, proved to be not as large as it 
had been previously feared. The natural gas price increase, naturally led to a rise in energy 
production costs, thus encouraging electricity imports from Russia and Estonia rather than 
domestic production (Štreimikiene 2008). We find a confirmation of this hypothesis by 
looking at the increase in electricity purchases by ETS firms over the period 2005-2007 (see 
Figure 5).  
Figure 4  Total purchase of fossil fuel inputs by ETS firms, 2003-2007 
 
Sources: The authors’ calculations from LS data. 
 
This shift away from CO2-intensive energy carriers into natural gas, and from fossil-based 
generation into imports can certainly explain the decrease in CO2 intensity discussed above. 
We next look at the role of investment in this process.  
Figure 5  Total purchase of electricity by ETS firms, 2004-2007 
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Sources: The authors’ calculations from LS data. 
Investment 
We now ask the question whether Lithuanian ETS firms invested in new technology following 
the commencement of carbon trading in 2005, and whether their behavioural change can be 
attributed to the EU ETS. The empirical literature in this area is very scant. Using a survey of 
Irish ETS firms over the period 2005-2008, Jaraitė, Convery, and Di Maria (2010) find 
suggestive evidence that ETS firms started investing to improve their carbon performance 
and achieve compliance under the (perceived) tight Irish permits allocation, already in 
preparation of the first phase. Anderson, Convery, and Di Maria (2010) use the same Irish 
survey data and find that the EU ETS has influenced the way investments in capital and 
infrastructure are planned in almost half of the surveyed firms. They also report that during 
the first phase there was a significant amount of technology adoption. Indeed, 50 per cent of 
the Irish firms in their sample report employing some form of new machinery or equipment 
that contributed to decreasing their CO2 emissions. Löfgren, Wråke, Hagberg, and Roth 
(2013), on the other hand, fail to find any statistically significant impact of the EU ETS on the 
investment decision of regulated Swedish firms. Their focus is, however, slightly different 
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from the papers above, as they only analyse investment in carbon mitigating technologies in 
a sample of Swedish firms between 2002 and 2008. Our data do not include investment data 
per se, but we have information on each firm’s total tangible capital assets over time. In 
what follows, we use changes in these assets as a proxy for net capital investment. 
Figure 6 shows that the average value of tangible assets among ETS firms in our sample 
declined steadily throughout the first phase. Thus, it seems unlikely that Lithuanian firms 
improved their carbon efficiency due to the introduction of new technology. 
Figure 6 Average tangible assets of ETS firms, 2003-2010 
 
Sources: The authors’ calculations from LS data. 
The figure, together with the results reported in Table 9, indicate that this trend was, 
however, reversed in 2009, and that this change is exclusive to ETS firms in our sample. 
These results are consistent with the view that the introduction of the EU ETS did cause the 
retirement of old and less efficient tangible assets during the first trading years. In the 
second phase, instead, the evidence indicates that ETS firms started investing in new capital 
equipment. One factor that might have led to the 2010 increase is the significant legislative 
change that took place in 2009. On July 7, 2009 the Lithuanian Parliament passed law XI-329 
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(Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania 2009), which limited the possibility to recycle revenues 
from the sale of EUAs. The law in fact mandates that all revenues received from the sale of 
EUAs should be earmarked to be spent on environmental measures.  
Profitability 
The final part of our analysis focuses on assessing the effect of the EU ETS on Lithuanian ETS 
firms’ profitability. Indeed, one of the main concerns raised by the introduction of the EU 
ETS was the possible deterioration of the competitive position of those ETS sectors most 
exposed to international competition. It is clear, however, that some of the concerns related 
to profitability would be alleviated by the fact that within the EU ETS permits are 
grandfathered, i.e. allocated for free to firms in the EU ETS. In this case, each entity is faced 
with a clear trade-off between using the permits for compliance purposes (and incurring the 
opportunity cost of the foregone sale) and selling them on the market (and incurring the cost 
of abatement). It is this trade-off that generates abatement incentives for efficient firms, 
who then benefit from the proceeds of the sale of the excess allowances.  Revenues from 
the sale of EUAs are potentially large, and may help bolster the profitability of firms, 
especially in sectors and countries that received a generous allocation of permits. As 
discussed in Section 2, Lithuanian firms in all sectors were very generously allocated, and, 
despite the price collapse, benefited from the sale of EUAs to foreign entities (See Table 3).  
Our dataset contains several profit measures, based on financial accounting including gross 
profit (profit from the main production activities), and profit before tax (profit that takes into 
account net income from other activities). Although there are as yet no approved accounting 
standards on how the EUAs should be treated in financial statements, it is recommended to 
treat them as intangible assets (Rimašauskas 2009). Hence, the net income from 
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buying/selling EUAs should be recorded among the net income from the other activities. As a 
consequence, we choose to analyse the relative profit before tax, which is measured as 
profit before tax over turnover. In what follows, we simply refer to this measure as “profit”. 
Figure 7 Average profitability of ETS firms, 2003-2010 
 
Sources: The authors’ calculations from LS data. 
The average profitability among ETS firms in our sample (Figure 7) and the matching results 
presented in Table 9 show that ETS firms in Lithuania do not seem to have suffered from 
their membership of the emission trading scheme in the early stages of the programme. Our 
results suggest, however, that they might have become less profitable in both 2009 and 
2010. The year-on-year changes are similar but with slightly higher significance already in 
2007 and 2008. These findings are not surprising, given the amount of over-allocation 
enjoyed by Lithuanian ETS firms in the first trading phase. The results are also consistent 
with the findings of Ellerman and Trotingnon (2009) that ETS firms in Lithuania were able to 
monetise their EUA surplus in the first trading period. As discussed in Section 2, ETS firms in 
Lithuania exported most of their unused allowances in 2007, but the highest revenue was 
earned in 2006 (see Table 2). This might explain the dip in 2007. Subsequent drops might 
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instead be explained by the Lithuanian second period allocation being much tighter than the 
first one.  
In essence, our results run counter the statement that the EU ETS exerted a drag on ETS 
firms’ competitiveness and profitability, at least in the context of our case study. In addition 
to that, although the available data do not allow us to fully understand the pass-through of 
opportunity costs, we believe that the above findings do not support the hypothesis that 
costs have been passed through to consumers. At least four reasons can explain it. Firstly, if 
there had been the pass-through of the opportunity costs into final consumer prices, we 
would have observed a persistent EU ETS effect on ETS firms’ profits. The second reason 
relates to structure of the markets in which ETS firms operate. ETS firms operating outside 
the power generating sector, e.g. in the glass, ceramics, refining and food sectors, are more 
exposed to domestic and international competition, and thus have limited latitude to pass-
through opportunity costs. Thirdly, as most of the Lithuanian firms in the EU ETS had more 
allowances than they needed, they might not have perceived the full opportunity cost of the 
freely allocated allowances. Finally, in Lithuania energy end-user prices were regulated in the 
first trading period and beyond, implying that, in the power-generating sector, firms could 
not have adjusted end-user prices to CO2 price fluctuations. Nevertheless, a more detailed 
investigation of these effects would form an interesting topic for future research.  
Testing the common-trends assumption 
Our analysis relies on the important assumption that the trends in the outcome variables 
over time should be the same across the ETS and non-ETS firms in our sample. Given the 
systematic differences in firm size between ETS and non-ETS firms, it is very important to 
test whether this assumption holds for our data sample. Since we have only two years of the 
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pre-treatment data, we run a so called placebo DID matching test for those two years (2003 
and 2004). In this test, we treat the year 2003 as a pre-treatment year and the year 2004 – 
as a treatment year. The results17 of the placebo DID matching test show that there are no 
statistical differences in the outcome variables (namely, CO2 emissions, CO2 emission 
intensity, tangible capital assets and profitability) between the treatment and control groups 
for 2003-2004. This suggests that the pre-ETS trends in the outcome variables are the same 
for the ETS and the non-ETS firms in our sample. As they are the same before the EU ETS was 
implemented, it will lend some support for the assumption that they are the same after the 
EU ETS started. In addition to that, these results might indicate that expectations regarding 
the introduction of the EU ETS were not realised before the year 2005.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented new evidence on the effects of the EU ETS on participating firms. 
In particular, thanks to the features of our dataset, we were able to assess the impact of the 
EU ETS directly on CO2 emissions and their intensity at the firm level, and to study the 
behaviour of ETS firms as refers to their investments and profitability. Our results indicate 
that the EU ETS overall did not cause reduction in CO2 emissions over the whole first trading 
period. This is understandable, due to the marked over-allocation of the installations in our 
dataset. We do observe, however, that CO2 emission intensity decreased between 2006 and 
2007, albeit slightly. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to investigate whether 
this decrease was a one-off effect or continued in the second phase of the EU ETS. We also 
                                                          
17
 Due to space constraints, the results of this test are not reported here. They can be provided by the authors 
upon request.  
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find that Lithuanian ETS firms shifted out of expensive energy carriers, like oil and gas, into 
coal, which remained competitive due to the low price of allowances after 2006. We argue 
that two factors external to the participation in the ETS, namely the closing of the first 
reactor of the Ignalina NPP and the high gas prices, led ETS firms in Lithuania to increase 
their imports of cheaper electricity from neighbouring countries, causing a possible degree 
of carbon leakage.  
Although the EU-wide emission trading system did not seem have encouraged firms to 
mitigate their CO2 emissions in the short-run, our analysis suggests that this policy induced 
the retirement of old (and less efficient) capital stock during the first trading years, and lead 
to some additional investments into new capital equipment from 2010. The latter effect was 
probably compounded by the introduction of law XI-329 (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania 
2009), which required the earmarking of allowance sales’ revenues for environmental 
investments. The injection of new, likely more efficient, capital into the existing Lithuanian 
capital stock suggests that more substantial emission reductions are to be expected in the 
near future when capital is fully operational. 
In terms of economic effects, our results indicate that the EU ETS did not represent a drag on 
the profitability of Lithuanian ETS firms. This finding, while derived from a small sample of 
EU ETS firms, is nevertheless consistent with the analyses of, for example, Ellerman, 
Convery, and de Perthuis (2010), and contributes to alleviate the competitiveness concerns 
raised by many industry representatives. At the same time, our findings do not support 
common speculations that the generous permit allocation generated huge windfall profits 
for the largest polluters.  
Overall, our results lend support to the idea that the stringency of the first two phases of the 
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EU ETS was modest at best, as we find that the EU ETS made very little difference in terms of 
the environmental and economic performance of the firms involved in the scheme.  
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Table 9 Effects of the EU ETS participation – environmental and economic outcome variables 
 
Year  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Method NN Kernel NN Kernel NN Kernel NN Kernel NN Kernel NN Kernel 
Outcome: Changes compared to 2004 
CO2 emissions (kt) 15.6 17.2 -4.0 -2.6 29.4 30.4 - - - - - - 
 
(16.0) (14.6) (21.4) (24.6) (40.0) (46.8) 
      
CO2 emission intensity (t/000’ LTL) 0.017 0.108 -0.004 0.057 -0.212 -0.174 - - - - - - 
 
(0.149) (0.144) (0.182) (0.120) (0.234) (0.218) 
      
Tangible capital assets (000’ LTL) -268294* -279182** -231511* -241331** -205228* -212534** -236077** -243133** -238193* -245108* 138267* 147359** 
 
(167868) (152869) (158402) (142307) (124378) (123191 (136610) (129401) (162769) (153047) (89324) (86612) 
Profitability (000’LTL/000’ LTL) 0.046 0.071 0.045 0.056 -0.022 -0.002) -0.119 -0.112 -0.116* -0.092 -0.178* -0.177* 
  (0.089) (0.075) (0.053) (0.048) (0.063) (0.049) (0.102) (0.101) (0.084) (0.085) (0.123) (0.130) 
Outcome: year-on-year changes 
            
CO2 emissions (kt) 15.6 17.2 -19.6 -19.8 33.4 33.0 - - - - - - 
 
(13.6) (14.3) (18.6) (14.4) (32.9) (33.0) 
      
CO2 emission intensity (t/000’LTL) 0.017 0.108 -0.021 -0.051 -0.208* -0.232* - - - - - - 
 
(0.168) (0.142) (0.129) (0.117) (0.145) (0.144) 
      
Tangible capital assets (000’LTL) -268294* -279182** 36783* 37851** 26284* 28797** -30849** -30599** -2116 -1975 376460* 392466** 
 
(193011) (160858) (23768) (21504) (17504) (16861) (15774) (14696) (23362) (22164) (267101) (185823) 
Profitability (000’LTL/000’LTL) 0.046 0.071 -0.001 -0.016 -0.067** -0.057** -0.097* -0.110** 0.003 0.021 -0.062 -0.085* 
 
(0.077) (0.067) (0.065) (0.058) (0.037) (0.028) (0.075) (0.058) (0.144) (0.141) (0.058) (0.059) 
Notes: 
1. ***p <=0.01, **p <= 0.05, *p <= 0.1, the p-values are calculated using one-tailed t-tests.  
2. The bootstrapped standard errors are in the parentheses. 
3. All monetary variables are in real terms. 
4. There are 41 ETS firms in the treated group. 
5. Kernel matching is based on 312 firms in the control group. 
6. NN matching with replacement is based on 22 firms in the control group. 
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Appendix: The conversion of fuel purchase into CO2 emissions 
CO2 emissions are produced when carbon based fuels are burned. Therefore we produce our 
CO2 emissions estimates based on the amount of fossil fuels purchased (unfortunately, the 
data on fossil fuel use is not available) and on the carbon content of fuels. The calculation of 
CO2 emissions can be broken down into three steps: (1) calculate fuel consumption in 
original units by dividing nominal fossil fuel purchases by nominal fossil fuel prices (see Table 
A1); (2) convert fuel units to common energy units by using specific net calorific values (see 
Table A2); and (3) multiply energy units by CO2 emission factors to compute carbon content 
(see Table A3). 
The LS data set provides only three types of fossil fuel purchases: coal, petroleum products 
and natural gas. As it is unknown what specific petroleum fuels are covered in the category 
of petroleum products, crude oil prices, net calorific value and CO2 conversion factors are 
used instead. 
Table A1 Lithuania’s nominal fossil fuel and electricity prices, 2003-07/10 
Fuel forms Unit 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Coal LTL/tonne 133.1 143.6 172.5 165.3 163.2    
Crude oil LTL/tonne 580.8 635.1 944.3 1303 1212.7    
Natural gas LTL/1000 m3 243 229.2 237.2 339.6 468.3    
Electricity 
(industry) 
LTL/kWh 0.2252 0.2295 0.2324 0.2343 0.2602 0.3349 0.3579 0.4335 
Sources: Lithuanian Energy Institute and the IEA statistics database. 
Table A2 Lithuania’s net calorific values of fossil fuels 
Fuel forms Unit NCV 
Coal TJ/Gg (kilotonne) 25.12 
Crude oil TJ/Gg (kilotonne) 42.3 
Natural gas GJ/1000 m3 33.49 
Sources: Lithuanian Energy Institute and IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories. 
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Table A3 Lithuania’s CO2 emission factors 
Fuel forms Unit CO2 emission factors 
Coal Kg/GJ 95 
Crude oil Kg/GJ 78 
Natural gas Kg/GJ 56.9 
Source:  The Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania. 
The main uncertainty about the CO2 emission estimates arises from the fact that the 
available fossil fuel purchase data are aggregated. That is we cannot explicitly determine 
what share of fossil fuel purchase is used for combustion and processes that are accounted 
by the EU ETS. In this regard, the CO2 emission estimates are upward biased. Secondly, the 
data correspond to fuel purchase rather than fuel use. This might introduce some timing 
issues of emission release, especially if firms have a sufficient capacity to store fossil fuels. In 
our analysis we assume that fossil fuel purchase materializes into CO2 emissions in the same 
year. Thirdly, the purchase data are available on a firm level rather than on an installation 
level, meaning that if a firm has other, smaller installations which are not in the EU ETS, we 
might get higher emissions then the ones included in the EU ETS. Again, in this respect we 
will get the upward biased CO2 estimates. All these suggest that the results for the estimates 
that involve CO2 emissions should be interpreted with caution, and that signs of the 
econometric estimates should be preferred over the magnitudes. 
 
